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ABSTRACT
The detection of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks remains
a challenge for the cloud environment, affecting a massive
number of services and applications hosted by such virtual-
ized infrastructures. Typically, in the literature, the detection
of DoS attacks is performed solely by analyzing the traf-
fic of packets in the network. This work advocates for the
use of telemetry from the cloud to detect DoS attacks using
Machine Learning algorithms. Our hypothesis is based on
richness of such native data collection services, with met-
rics from both physical and virtual hosts. Our preliminary
results demonstrate that DoS can be identified accurately
with k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) and decision tree (CART).
1 INTRODUCTION
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a pressing problem in
computer networks, and it becomes an even more complex
problem in cloud computing environments. According to the
Verisign report of 2018, these kinds of attacks directly impact
business, financial, information technology and telecommu-
nications services [4].
The migration of traditional services and applications to
centralized cloud environments amplifies their vulnerabil-
ity to disruption in relation to the impact of DoS attacks
performed over conventional architectures. Thus, there is
an urgent need to perform the identification and charac-
terization of DoS traffic in cloud environments. In general,
there are three ways to perform traffic classification: i) iden-
tification using TCP/UDP port numbers; ii) inspecting the
contents of the network packets; and, finally, iii) applying
Machine Learning (ML) techniques to network data source
[1]. This paper advances the latter, and proposes the use of
ML algorithms in order to distinguish malicious traffic from
legitimate traffic from clients in a cloud environment. ML
algorithms have been already used for traffic identification
and classification [3], including malicious ones, to spot the
occurrence of a DoS attack.
According to a recent survey [2], the traditional data
source used by ML algorithms are traces of traffic in the
network (packets). It is well-known that DoS attacks sys-
temically affects the usage of cloud computing resources.
Different from traditional approached based on traffic traces,
this work proposed the use of the telemetry from the cloud
(such as resources usage from physical and virtual hosts) as
data source for ML algorithms.
Large scale monitoring traffic in conventional networks
usually involves costly and complex architectures, probe
packets and other artifices. In contrast, clouds have native
telemetry, i.e., data collection services. Metrics from both
physical and virtual hosts. Moreover, such rich data set can
be used with little or no overhead to the cloud. Therefore,
the research hypothesis of this paper is that it is possible to
improve identification and accuracy of DoS attacks using
the information from the usage of computing resources from
physical and virtual hosts allocated to the applications and
services.
2 EVALUATION
As an initial scenario of this proposal, we monitor the usage
of computing resources of a cloud under the TCP SYN Flood
attack. This attack has been chosen because it is simple to
perform and reproduce. An experimental setup has been
created with an OpenStack cloud (Rocky version), containing
a web server using Apache2, a virtual machine simulating
legitimate web clients with Siege 1. Finally, another host
performs the role of malicious users and generates the SYN
Flood Attack with hping32.
Two test scenarios have been performed. In the first test
there is only legitimate clients, generating traffic at from
users so that the web server can hold it. In the second test,
however, along with legitimate clients, SYN Flood attack is
executed. During both tests, the following metrics are mon-
itored by the OpenStack cloud: CPU and Memory usage,
number of disk read requests, number of disk write requests,
rate of incoming and outgoing Bytes in each network inter-
face, rate of incoming and outgoing packets in each network
interface.
1https://www.joedog.org/siege-home/
2https://linux.die.net/man/8/hping3
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Figure 1: Comparison between the metrics in both scenarios.
In both tests, the total duration is 30 minutes. There are
attack phases with different intensities, which last 10minutes
each. There are 10s gaps at beginning and at ending parts
of our trace with no legitimate clients’ nor attacker’s traffic.
Metrics are collected every 5 seconds performing a total
of 360 samples. The attack is divided into three phases of
10 minutes each. In the first one, the attack happens at a
small rate i.e., at every 300 milliseconds. In the second phase,
10 minutes after, the malicious attacks happens every 250
milliseconds. Finally, in the last phase, the attack is generated
at the maximum rate that the attacking host can perform.
Given the measurements of the two experiments, a Prin-
cipal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to verify which
metrics are relevant in the case of a TCP SYN Flood attack.
A sample comparison of these metrics is shown in Figure 1.
In all the results, the blue lines represent the tests performed
only in the client scenario and the red lines in the client and
attacker scenario. According to these results the following
metrics were chosen: CPU usage, number of disk write re-
quests, rate of incoming and outgoing Bytes, rate of incoming
and outgoing packets.
After the selection of the most important characteristics,
the traffic labeling in the data is performed. These sam-
ples are used as a training dataset for two different ML al-
gorithms: k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) and a decision tree
(CART). These simple algorithms were chosen for the sake
of simplicity to obtain preliminary results in order to ver-
ify our hypothesis regarding ML exploiting could telemetry.
The data from this dataset has been labeled in two classes:
"attack" and "no attack".
In addition, another experiment was carried out, with
a duration of 120 minutes, alternating between moments
of traffic with only legitimate clients, only attacker and a
Table 1: Result of ML algorithms
ML Algorithms Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
kNN 99.30 99.33 99.31 99.31
CART 91.07 95.53 91.08 92.38
combination between both legitimate clients and attackers.
With the collected metrics of this experiment, the trained
kNN and CART tries to identify attack periods.
The Table 1 presents the results (in percentage) of the
Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F1-Score metrics obtained in
the dataset using the kNN and CART algorithms, being the
first line for the kNN and the last line for the decision tree
algorithm (CART). In these preliminary tests a high accuracy
was verified, with low incidence of false positives and false
negatives, mainly in the kNN algorithm.
3 CONCLUSION
Given the promising results, the proposal to use data from
the resources usage from cloud computing environment is a
feasible hypothesis.
As future work, we aim at performing the characterization
of other types of DoS attacks, as well as combinations of these
types.We intend not only to detect that an attack is occurring
(anomaly detection), but also, through ML algorithms, to
perform (real-time) the identification of what kind of attack
is going on. Another future work is to explore different ML
algorithms, including the use of deep learning.
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